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Abstract—Ad-hoc networks are independent of any infrastruc-
ture. The nodes are autonomous and make their own decisions.
They also have limited energy resources. Thus, a node tends to
behave selfishly when it is asked to forward the packets of other
nodes. Indeed, it would rather choose to reject a forwarding
request in order to save its energy. To overcome this problem, the
nodes need to be motivated to cooperate. To this end, we propose
a self-learning repeated game framework to enforce cooperation
between the nodes of a network. This framework is inspired
by the concept of “The Weakest Link” TV game. Each node
has a utility function whose value depends on its cooperation
in forwarding packets on a route as well as the cooperation of
all the nodes that form this same route. The more these nodes
cooperate the higher is their utility value. This would establish a
cooperative spirit within the nodes of the networks. All the nodes
will then more or less equally participate to the forwarding tasks
which would then eventually guarantee a more efficient packets
forwarding from sources to respective destinations. Simulations
are run and the results show that the proposed framework
efficiently enforces nodes to cooperate and outperforms two other
self-learning repeated game frameworks which we are interested
in.
Index Terms—Ad-hoc networks, game theory, repeated game,
self-learning, cooperation, punishment scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless Ad-hoc networks, nodes are self-organizing and
autonomous. They manage their own resources and make their
own decisions. In order to maintain network connectivity, each
node has to forward packets of other nodes. However, since
they are known to have limited battery resources, these nodes
usually tend to be non-cooperative. Indeed, they might some-
times reject forwarding requests in order to save their proper
energy. Thus, nodes are reluctant to participate in routing
which may lead the network connectivity to break down. It
is then necessary to provide a mechanism that enforces coop-
eration between nodes and maintains the network connectivity.
The problem of forwarding packets in a non-cooperative Ad-
hoc network is widely studied, as we highlight afterwards,
and many approaches have been proposed. The nodes act
selfishly and tend to maximize their own benefits, thus, most
of these studies rely on game theory [1] which is a suitable
tool to deal with complex interactions between network nodes.
From this perspective, the approaches can be classified into
two categories depending on the mechanism used to enforce
cooperation level between nodes. In the first category, the
propositions use the virtual payment scheme. Zhong et al.
[2] have proposed Sprite, a credit-based system that makes
incentives for nodes to cooperate. Eidenbenz et al. have
designed COMMIT [3], a routing protocol based on payment
with virtual currencies. The requested intermediate nodes will
perceive a compensation that is related to their residual energy
level. Ad Hoc-VCG [4] and incentives modeling advanced by
Crowcroft et al. [5] also belong to the first category. In the
second one, the approaches employ mechanisms to enforce
and maintain cooperation between nodes communities. Some
works use reputation-based mechanisms. In instance, Kwon
et al. [6] who have formulated a Stackelberg game where
two nodes sequentially estimate the willingness of each other
and decide to cooperate or not according to the opponent
reputation score. Also, Buchegger and Le Boudec [7], [8]
have defined mechanisms taking into consideration reputation
system. Other solutions aim to maintain cooperation by con-
sidering punishment threat. In this case, Marti et al. [9] have
defined “watchdog” and “pathrater” techniques that improve
throughput by excluding misbehaving nodes. Felegyhazi et al.
[10] have proposed a scheme that enables the nodes to reach
the Nash Equilibrium, under topological conditions (i.e. depen-
dence graph), relying on the “Tit-For-Tat” punishment. Altman
et al. [11] have highlighted the “aggressive” punishment in
[10] and have proposed milder punishment mechanism which
guaranties a Nash Equilibrium and helps nodes to consume
less energy. Han et al. [12] have advanced a self-learning
repeated framework based on punishment that determines the
nodes optimal packet forwarding probabilities to maintain
network connectivity. Pandana et al. [13] have considered the
same aim as in [12] and have designed three learning schemes
with a punishment mechanism under perfect/imperfect local
observation and dependence graph conditions.
In this paper, we propose a self-learning repeated game
framework inspired by “The Weakest Link” TV game. In
our approach, the set of nodes forming a route are consid-
ered as the candidates of the chains in the TV game. Each
node forwarding probability can be seen as good answer
probability for each candidate. Indeed, the maximization of
global collective gains depends strongly on the cooperation
between the candidates involved in the game. Thereby, we
adopt the TV game concept to design our scheme with the
objective of motivating nodes to create the longest chains
and maximizing their utility values. This would increase the
probability that the packets are delivered to the destination
and then would optimize packets forwarding. Moreover, the
framework relevance lies in the repeated game that enforces
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collaboration between nodes and a learning scheme that tend to
reach better cooperation level. We consider also a punishment
mechanism that would discourage nodes from acting selfishly.
To asses the efficiency of our proposal, we compare our
proposal to two other self-learning repeated game schemes
proposed in [12] and [13].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, the proposed model based on the “Weakest Link”
TV game principle is illustrated. The self-learning repeated
game framework and punishment scheme are then presented
in Section III. Section IV details simulations scenarios used
to evaluate our proposal and analyzes the obtained results.
Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
To optimize packet forwarding in Ad-hoc networks, we
strongly believe that applying the concept of the “Weakest
Link” TV game is an interesting solution. We explain, firstly,
the concept of the game that we want to reproduce and then
we detail the proposed model.
A. The “Weakest Link” TV Game Principle
Weakest Link TV game is a game where a group of
candidates try to answer correctly, relying on their knowledge,
to the questions asked by the TV host. They aim to gather
the highest amount of money through successive rounds. In
each round, the players try to form a chain of nine correct
answers to reach the highest gain. Before answering to a
question, a candidate has the possibility to save the collected
gain, provided by good answers of precedent candidates, by
saying “Bank”. It is obvious that the longer the chain is, the
higher the gain gets. Nevertheless, a player who gives a wrong
answer to a question and did not save the collected gains
shall break the good answers chain and reset the gain to zero.
Secondly, if the candidates save rapidly the collected gains,
the chains will be too short to reach important amounts of
money. Thus, answering wrongly or saving collected money
return the chain counter to zero. The candidates have to avoid
being frequently in these situations if they want to maximize
their gains. The earnings scale expresses the potential round
gain according to correct answers chain length. For example,
if there are four good answers and the current player decides
to save collected money, the total gains grow with the amount
that corresponds to the chain length. Then, the candidates try
to create another chain of good answers. Therefore, the key
parameter that influences the maximization of earnings is the
probability of giving a correct answer.
B. The Proposed Model: Analogy with the “Weakest Link” TV
Game
Our objective is to define an approach that enforces co-
operation in a distributed way. The model we propose is
inspired by the principle of the TV game. We note interesting
analogies between “The Weakest Link” TV game and the Ad-
hoc network. The nodes are assumed to be the candidates of
the game and forwarding a packet from a node to the next
hop is considered as a good answer. We believe strongly that
the TV game concept can be used to encourage nodes to
cooperate and therefore to optimize packet forwarding. Hence,
the nodes, along a route, aim to create the longest chain of
successful forwarded packets to get better utility. Despite of
the TV game, when a chain of forwarded packet is broken,
only the nodes that form the chain and the node which saves
the gains will be rewarded. The set of all nodes composing
the route is rewarded by the collected gains only if the packet
reaches destination. To formulate the expected utility of a node
in a route, we propose expressions inspired by [14]. Let αi and
βi be the forwarding and the saving gain (with chain breaking)
probabilities, respectively, for each node i. We assume in our
work that αi = 1 − βi. Given a route R with N -1 hops (N
nodes), we define in Eq. (1) the average gain that a node
i can expect when it plays the role of the nth link of the
chain. Let S(i) be the next hop of node i in route R. We
mean by C[n] the collected earnings when a chain of (n-1)
successful transmissions is transformed in currency and by F
the cost of forwarding other’s packets. Considering the vector
of forwarding probabilities α, the utility of a node i is given
by:
URi (n, α) =

URS(i)(1, α) if n = 0
(1− αi).C[n]+
αi.(U
R
S(i)(n+ 1, α)− F ) if 0 < n < N
C[n] if n = N
(1)
When the node i is an intermediate node and given that it
wants to maximize its gains, it has to choose between saving
the collected currency or increasing the chain length (relying
on the cooperation of the successor(s) to maximize benefits
despite of the cost of forwarding). We assume that the source
of the packet (i.e. n=0) will send it with the probability equal
to 1. Subsequently, the gains depend on the decisions of the
next hops. In addition, when the packet reaches the destination
(i.e. n=N ), the node will save the collected gains with a
probability equal to 1. In the latter case, the chain has the
length of the route and the gains are maximized.
Therefore, we can formulate this problem as a non-
cooperative game where each node will adjust its forwarding
probability in order to maximize its own utility. A node i can
belong to more than one route, its own utility is then the sum
of each route utility, called Ui. To solve this problem, it is
necessary to find the Nash Equilibrium of the game.
Definition1: The Nash Equilibrium is some strategy set α∗
for all nodes, such that for each node i, the following condition
is verified:
Ui(α
∗
i , α
∗
−i) ≥ Ui(αi, α∗−i),∀i, ∀αi ∈ [0, 1] (2)
Where α∗−i = (α
∗
1, . . . , α
∗
i−1, α
∗
i+1, . . . , α
∗
N ).
This condition emphasizes that no node can increase its
utility by operating a unilateral change of its forwarding
probability, while all other nodes play the Nash Equilibrium
Fig. 1. The self-learning repeated game flowchart
strategy. However, as mentioned in several works as [11]–[13],
this equilibrium matches with the strategy where αi = 0,∀i.
To avoid a poor network performance, we propose a self-
learning repeated game framework, inspired by the concept
of “The Weakest Link” TV game that we call The Weakest
Link scheme. The objective of this framework is to enforce
cooperation between nodes through learning and punishing
threat mechanisms.
III. SELF-LEARNING REPEATED GAME FRAMEWORK AND
PUNISHMENT MECHANISM
As the Nash Equilibrium corresponds to a non-cooperative
strategy, it is more suitable to design cooperation under repet-
itive game. Applying repeated game scheme match perfectly
with our proposed model. Indeed, in each game step, along
each route, the nodes try to maximize their utilities and
would choose to cooperate. In this paper, we consider an
infinite repeated game, where the game duration is unknown
to all nodes. Relying on the Folk theorem [15], the outcome
of an infinitely repeated game can give better payoffs than
those that can be obtained with Nash Equilibrium, especially
when permanent punishment threat obliges selfish nodes to
be more cooperative. Therefore, we propose a repeated game
that enforces cooperation and maintains it through a designed
punishment mechanism to encounter misbehaving forwarders.
The framework we propose is presented by the flowchart in
the Fig. 1.
In the initialization step, all nodes are more or less selfish.
They can set their forwarding probabilities to 0 (the Nash
Equilibrium strategy played with one stage game). We assume
that the routes are determined with a routing protocol and
that each node knows all the routes to which it belongs, as
considered in [12], [13]. Then, the nodes start playing repeated
game strategy. Note that they are rational and want to make
benefits. Thus, at each step, each node learns through its
utility the cooperation level of other nodes and adjusts its
forwarding probability following to the others learnt behavior.
It is possible that a node deviates from cooperation, then a
punishment scheme is designed to discourage misbehaving
nodes and to ask them to be more cooperative in the future.
It is applied as soon as a selfish behavior is detected and
subsequently the framework satisfies the Folk theorem.
A. The punishment mechanism
In this section, we present the punishment mechanism
through a simple scenario. We assume that A and B are two
successive nodes along a route. We suppose that the node B is
a misbehaving node. The node A as one among the “closest”
nodes to node B (i.e. the predecessor of B) is designed to
punish it (if B rejects the request of A). We assume that the
node A is able to detect the lack of cooperation of B (able
to distinguish between a packet drop and a packet loss); the
node A can conclude, by listening the channel, that node B
is misbehaving when it does not forward the packet to the
next node. To punish the selfish node B, the node A fixes
its forwarding probability to 0 when the packet has to pass
through node B. In this case, the node B will not be able
to receive any packet from node A. Thereafter, the node B
will be excluded from all chains in which its predecessor is
in punishment mode. This punishment cancels the node B
benefits for a period T and enforces it to cooperate (as its
utility decreases). To avoid the propagation of the punishment
mode over all nodes, when the node A is designated to punish
the node B, the former one informs its predecessor about the
execution of the punishment. Then, the punishment act is not
interpreted as a deviation. It is important to mention that we
assume that the nodes are not malicious.
B. The self-learning repeated game framework description
At each step of the repeated game, each node compares its
current utility value with the former value. If the current utility
is better, a cooperation enforcement is concluded. Thereby,
the forwarding probability is increased proportionally with
the enhancement of the utility to promote the cooperation
level. The upgrade of the cooperation level is also led by
the coefficient λi. It expresses the node sensitivity to the
cooperation enforcement. However, when the current utility
drops, it is analyzed as a come back to selfishness. Thus,
the forwarding probability will decrease (proportionally with
the difference). Analogically with “The Weakest Link” TV
game, a candidate chooses to break the chain and insures
gains if he notices that the following candidate tends to make
wrong answers. Hence, cooperative nodes are sensitive to the
behavior of the other nodes. As described in the punishment
scheme, a node checks if its successor deviates. This deviation
can be the result of punishment and an announcement is made
to avoid selfishness propagation. The deviation without any
Fig. 2. The evolution of the average forwarding probability for different
self-learning repeated game schemes in the case of the ring network
notification is considered as a selfish behavior and then the
punishment procedure is applied on the misbehaving node.
Indeed, during a period T , no packet from its punishing
predecessor reaches it. This causes a dramatic utility de-
crease. Therefore, a punished node is encouraged to be more
cooperative in order to avoid longer penalization. Indeed,
it increases its forwarding probabilities by a step equal to
εi. To make possible the cooperation enforcement, another
assumption must be considered. In fact, if the maximum gains
that can be collected are lower than the forwarding cost, the
nodes would not forward any packet even under punishment
threat. Finally, it is important to mention that the proposed
scheme work well when the mobility is moderate. In other
words, transferring all packets on a route must be faster than
route breakage due to mobility. We take into consideration this
assumption in our simulations.
This framework aims to find the longest chains on a route
between source and destination nodes, and routes are provided
by a routing protocol to all nodes. If a route is not available at
any node in the route, the routing tables must be updated.
Moreover, the forwarding probability can be used by the
routing protocol to determine better routes or to update routes
in order to avoid misbehaving nodes to be a part of a route.
Also, it is important to mention that this framework is adapted
to scenarios where some nodes can either be only sources
and/or destinations of packets as a source node forwards its
packets to the next hop with a probability equal to 1 (only
if the source node apply the punishment mechanism) and a
destination node is not involved in the forwarding process.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND SIMULATIONS
RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performances of the pro-
posed approach through two scenarios: the widely used ring
network and the random network. We compare our proposal
to two other approaches which have inspired us: the scheme
proposed by Han et al. [12] and the learning through flooding
algorithm designed by Pandana et al. [13]. We implement our
framework and do scenarios simulations on MATLAB 7.8.0.
Fig. 3. The evolution of the average forwarding probability for different
self-learning repeated game schemes in the case of a random network
Firstly, we consider a ring network of 25 nodes. The
distance between any source and destination is N hops (if a
node i is the source, node mod(i+N, 25) is the destination).
For each intermediate node, it is imperative that the forwarding
cost must be less important than the maximum gain along
a route. By the way, the nodes must have benefits in order
to maintain a cooperative behavior. In our simulations, each
successful forwarding increments by 1 the gain corresponding
to the formed chain. In this scenario, we fix N to 6. We
consider that one node can be a source or a destination at
most one time and an intermediate node at most five times.
The nodes initialize their forwarding probabilities at 0 (i.e.
the Nash Equilibrium strategy). We choose also to fix the
forwarding cost to 3 (i.e. to make benefits possible) and the
period of punishment T to 3 time steps.
We represent in Fig. 2 the evolution of the average for-
warding probabilities for the considered self-learning repeated
game frameworks over 2000 time steps. For our proposal, we
depict two different scenarios and each one is characterized by
a specific value of ε (where εi = ε for all nodes and ε takes
respectively the values 0.01 and 0.05). The coefficient λi is
fixed to 0.01 for all nodes. We have also fixed the characteristic
parameters of the two other schemes as mentioned in the plot.
We invite the reader to refer to [12] and [13] in order to
understand the meaning of these parameters (we also assume
that each two successive nodes in a route are separated by
the same distance in order to simplify the computation of the
utility functions when the scheme of Pandana et al. is used).
First of all, we remark that the average forwarding prob-
ability observed for the scheme of Han et al. converges to
a value that turns around 0.6 and we note that the updates
of this average probability become less frequent as time
goes on. This finding logically indicates that the cooperation
between nodes is limited even if the average cooperation
level is rather substantial. The punishment mechanism adopted
by the framework of Han et al. is clearly the major cause
behind this result and we explain later the reasons behind
that. The average forwarding probability obtained for the
learning through flooding algorithm designed by Pandana et
TABLE I
EVALUATION METRICS IN THE CASE OF THE RING NETWORK (ALL
FORWARDING PROBABILITIES INITIALIZED TO 0)
`````````Schemes
Metrics Avg. PDR @ Dest. Fwd. Pkts / Dlv. Pkts
The Weakest Link (ε=0.01) 75.19% 5.1195
The Weakest Link (ε=0.05) 90.30% 5.0452
Pandana et al. 21.29% 5.7362
Han et al. 0.23% 182.7456
TABLE II
EVALUATION METRICS IN THE CASE OF A RANDOM NETWORK (ALL
FORWARDING PROBABILITIES INITIALIZED TO 0)
`````````Schemes
Metrics Avg. PDR @ Dest. Fwd. Pkts / Dlv. Pkts
The Weakest Link (ε=0.01) 92.94% 4.5709
The Weakest Link (ε=0.05) 98.21% 4.5459
Pandana et al. 67.31% 4.7061
Han et al. 1.62% 8.6341
al. converges to 1 but after too many steps (compared to the
Weakest Link scheme result). In their evaluation, Pandana et
al. have chosen an initial forwarding strategy for nodes (i.e all
forwarding probabilities initialized to 0.5) different from the
Nash Equilibrium strategy (i.e. non-cooperative strategy). This
assumption enables to the nodes of the network that adopt
this scheme to reach more rapidly high cooperation levels
but leads to a skewed evaluation of the algorithm. Regarding
the Weakest Link scheme, the average forwarding probability
converges to 1, as the scheme of Pandana et al. but needs
less time to reach high cooperation levels. We depict the
corresponding evolution for two values of ε: 0.01 and 0.05.
We remark that the nodes become cooperative faster as they
are more reactive to the punishment mechanisms (i.e. higher
increase of the forwarding probability when punishment and
utility decrease are detected). Then, the scenario where ε is
equal to 0.05 highlights a quicker convergence of the average
forwarding probability.
To support these conclusions, we determine for each scheme
the average packet delivery rate at the destination and the
ratio between the forwarded packets and the delivered packets.
Table I lists the corresponding results for the ring network
scenario. It is important to remind that the routes have a
length of 6 hops. Then, in the ideal case when the nodes
fully cooperate, each packet delivered to the destination needs
5 forwards. The found results reflect the efficiency of our
scheme. This efficiency is tuned by the input parameters. As
we show, the choice of the parameter ε has an important
impact on the convergence speed of the average forwarding
probability to 1. The scheme of Pandana et al. shows a
limited efficiency over the simulation time because of the low
convergence to a satisfying cooperation level.
For the two cited schemes, the nodes become cooperative as
time goes on. The two algorithms rely on efficient punishment
mechanisms. They share the penalty of the misbehaving node
instead of all nodes in the network. The values obtained for
the ratios of forwarded packets over delivered packets (slightly
higher to 5) prove the effectiveness of these solutions to
establish cooperation among nodes (even with some delay for
the scheme of Pandana et al.). On the contrary, when a node
TABLE III
EVALUATION METRICS IN THE CASE OF THE RING NETWORK (ALL
FORWARDING PROBABILITIES INITIALIZED TO 0.5)
`````````Schemes
Metrics Avg. PDR @ Dest. Fwd. Pkts / Dlv. Pkts Avg. Trans. Eff.
The Weakest Link (ε=0.01) 95.24% 5.0555 0.1617
The Weakest Link (ε=0.05) 97.66% 5.0278 0.1639
Pandana et al. 93.84% 5.0492 0.1581
TABLE IV
EVALUATION METRICS IN THE CASE OF THE RANDOM NETWORK (ALL
FORWARDING PROBABILITIES INITIALIZED TO 0.5)
`````````Schemes
Metrics Avg. PDR @ Dest. Fwd. Pkts / Dlv. Pkts Avg. Trans. Eff.
The Weakest Link (ε=0.01) 99.77% 4.4674 0.1832
The Weakest Link (ε=0.05) 99.31% 4.4722 0.1829
Pandana et al. 93.54% 4.525 0.1778
that uses the framework of Han et al. detects a defection, it
punishes all other nodes. This reaction engenders the propa-
gation of the non-cooperative strategies and dramatically falls
down the network performance.
In the same way, we consider the scenario of a random
network consisting of 100 nodes with 1000 source-destination
pairs. Fig. 3 depicts the evolution of the average forwarding
probability for each scheme and Table II lists the evaluation
metrics for the scenario of the random network (the average
number of forwarders per route in this scenario is 4.535
nodes). The previous observations and interpretations match
with the results obtained for this scenario. We note also that the
performance of the Weakest Link and Pandana et al.’s schemes
are better. This can be explained by higher opportunities to
improve the utility function (i.e. nodes belong to a higher
number of routes) compared to the case of the ring network.
Pandana et al. have defined the utility function of a node
as its transmission efficiency. The transmission efficiency is
the ratio of successful self-transmission power over the total
consumed power (self-transmission and forwarding). We aim
to compare our proposal to the algorithm of Pandana et al.
using the cited criterion. We consider the same scenario of the
ring network, as previously, and we initialize the forwarding
probabilities of nodes at 0.5 to be as close as possible to the
simulation inputs considered by Pandana et al.
We list in Table III the average packet delivery rate, the
ratio of forwarded packets over delivered packets and the
average transmission efficiency obtained by the Weakest Link
scheme and the learning through flooding algorithm for the
ring network scenario (the same scenario as previously). We
note that the two frameworks highlight high packet delivery
rates at destination (i.e. over 93 % with better performance for
the Weakest Link scheme) and strong forwarding effectiveness
(i.e. ratios of forwarded packets over delivered packets slightly
higher than 5). Regarding the comparison based on the trans-
mission efficiency, Table III emphasizes that the Weakest Link
scheme (with the different values chosen for ε) reaches higher
average transmission efficiency than the algorithm of Pandana
et al. and then allows nodes to use better their energy. This
finding can be explained be the upper packet delivery rate at
the destination obtained for the Weakest Link scheme.
We can in addition emphasize that the behavior of nodes
under the Weakest Link scheme enables nodes to have more
“elastic” behavior towards defections. Thereafter, it is possible
to avoid useless forwards and save energy. In fact, when a
node detects a reduction in its utility function, it decreases
its forwarding probability and then becomes reluctant to
cooperate as the delivery of packets is not accurate. For the
algorithm of Pandana et al., the forwarding probability can
either increase or remain the same but never decreases. Then,
the nodes maintain their cooperation level even if a defection
is detected and can uselessly consume their energy.
We compute the same evaluation metrics for the case of a
random network which consists of 100 nodes and 1000 source-
destination pairs. Each route has at average 4.463 forwarders.
We list in Table IV the obtained results for this scenario.
We note that the effectiveness of our proposal is verified and
that the transmission efficiency provided by the Weakest Link
scheme is always better than the one of the algorithm of
Pandana et al..
We have to mention that Pandana et al. have also pro-
posed another framework based on utility prediction. It was
highlighted in [13] that this latter scheme enables nodes
to have better transmission efficiency. Anyway, the behavior
of the average forwarding probability follows the same one
of the learning through flooding scheme insofar as nodes
can only maintain or increase their forwarding probabilities.
Nevertheless, a convenient choice of the parameter ε for our
scheme enables us to still improve the network performance
if necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
In wireless Ad-hoc networks, nodes are requested to forward
traffic. However, because of limited energy resources, they
might refuse to collaborate in order to save their energy.
This can lead to a significant amount of lost packets and a
deterioration of the network performances.
In order to overcome this problem, we have proposed in
this paper a self-learning repeated game framework that aims
to enforce cooperation between nodes. Our framework is
inspired by “The Weakest Link” TV game concept. Indeed,
the amount of the global collective gains strongly depends
on the cooperation degree between the candidates involved
in the game. The candidates try to form the longest chain
in order to reach the highest gain. Analogically, the nodes,
along a route, would tend to achieve the longest sequence
of successful packet forwarding and therefore assure that the
packet reaches the destination. Our approach is designed as
a self-learning repeated game framework that enables nodes
to learn each others cooperation levels. Therefore, nodes that
are in a same route and that have a high cooperation level
may encourage the other nodes of the route to get more
cooperative. For this aim, a punishment mechanism has been
considered. Thereby, misbehaving nodes are punished and
their utility would dramatically decrease. This allows the
network to maintain a relatively satisfying cooperation level.
Simulations have been run and the results have shown that
our scheme is efficient for the ring network scenario as well
as for the random network scenario. It has been also shown
that our proposal outperforms the self-learning repeated game
frameworks that we have been interested in in this work.
As future work, it would be challenging to test our frame-
work on real testbeds as smart grids. From this perspective,
we want to enhance the Weakest Link scheme framework by
considering the different channel characteristics among nodes,
relaxing the assumption that a node is able to distinguish
between a packet drop and a packet loss and probably taking
into consideration the residual energy for each node as a
parameter in the utility function. All these perspectives would
be helpful to design a real cooperation enforcement framework
for multi-hop Ad-hoc networks.
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